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Front page: „Searching for Sustainable Living – Different Approaches, Shared Vision" was a conference that took place at Palacký University, Olomouc, Czech Republic (28-29 October 2015). The conference followed the EADI Management Committee Meeting and attracted over sixty participants from various European countries.

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Searching for Sustainable Living
Different Approaches, Shared Vision

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The Directors' meeting of EADI was the occasion for an interesting conference at Palacký University Olomouc, Czech Republic. The main theme was possible contributions to more sustainable ways of living. This very broad theme resonates with the discussions on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which were established by the UN just before the conference in the autumn of 2015. The seventeen goals can be grouped into several large categories of issues. The first five refer to improvements in the lives of all people, with a particular focus on the poor and vulnerable. The next two refer to the access and availability of two strategic basic resources - water and energy. The next three refer to economic growth, infrastructure, and inequalities within and between countries; issues underpinning development processes. SDG 11 is unique in focusing on cities and human settlements, recognizing the effect of global urbanization patterns of recent years in which the global population is now primarily urban. The next four SDGs focus on issues of environmental sustainability, acknowledging different types of ecosystems, the effects of production and consumption patterns, and the impact of climate change. The final two SDGs focus on the means of reaching the goals, by acknowledging the impact of conflicts, injustices, and the importance of global partnerships in implementing the goals effectively. The presentations at the Olomouc conference were wide-ranging, and all addressed the groupings of SDGs as suggested above in different ways.

Several presentations addressed issues concerning the ways in which people's lives can be or are being improved, with the focus mainly on the strategies households use in order to do so. Mackova and Kysucan presented the broad historic pattern of human mobility as an asset for improving wellbeing and they moved away from the current negative discussions on migration. They showed that migration is as old as humanity and suggested that current discussions on migration could be more usefully focused on regulation rather than prevention. Novacek, Kladivo and Mederly presented their work on a new index which is oriented towards the future challenges people face (a state of the future index). This is an interesting initiative in contrast to the range of indices currently being utilized, such as the Human Development Index and the Multiple deprivation Index (HDI, MPI), as it allows assessments to be made in the future as regards which interventions were most useful in retrospect.

The issue of access and availability of strategic basic resources was taken up by Zoomers, who discussed the issue of the global land rush and how we should interpret it. She described the issue of countries who import large amounts of food and therefore have started offshore agriculture in order to gain more secure access to the food imports they require. She showed how analyzing this issue has many pitfalls, ranging from a lack of data to the ways in which existing data should be interpreted. For instance, in analyzing the

effects of a land rush on the countries where off-shore agriculture is located, the amount of land is a less strategic indicator than an indicator linking the amount of arable land to population density and agricultural productivity. But her presentation showed that focusing on two resources in the SDGs, such as water and energy, should not preclude paying attention to other globally limited resources, such as arable land, with its implications for basic food security.

Baud addressed several issues falling within the remit of SDG 11, which uniquely focuses on urbanization and human settlements. She focused on the implications of the use of digitized and spatial knowledge management by local governments, the private sector and civil society organizations that local governments work with. Debates on 'smart cities' ignore the large-scale investments that are needed to supply the spatial data infrastructure to make cities 'smart', nor do they address the issues of accountability and access for citizens to the information used. However, Baud showed that the build-up of good information and knowledge from citizens can change internal processes within governments to make them more efficient, less corrupt, more effective, and able to provide opportunities for effective interaction with citizens. The latter however, depends on the political 'space' given to relationships between governments and citizens and on the recognition of community-based knowledge.

Finally, a number of presenters took up the issues of international cooperation and donor choices, with two interesting perspectives. The first concerned how research strengthens the role of donors. Vincent, working at the French Development Agency in the Research and Development Department (AfD), showed how the French agency stresses the importance of research and knowledge in influencing thinking about development challenges in its partnerships with other institutions. The Research department is included in the AfD's operational budget, which indicates the importance given to its activities[1]. The Agency works with a wide range of partners in co-constructing and promoting research and knowledge exchanges, among whom EADI's network is considered strategic for cutting-edge research, exchanges among scholars, and dissemination to a wider audience. Vincent showed how research on financial issues influences their strategies. ODA is becoming less important to developing countries, in comparison to direct foreign investment, remittances and private debt, as external sources of finance.

However, the most recent European Development Report (2015) shows that domestic public resources are emerging as by far the largest source of finance for developing countries. This implies that research focusing on increasing domestic tax revenues in developing countries and improving banking systems is a strategic topic. As developing countries mainly draw their revenues from taxation of (multinational) companies, issues such as bank secrecy, tax havens, and profit shifting are of major concern to developing countries. This is also reflected in the work done by the network dealing with issues of tax justice, coordinated by Martina Neuwirth, previously an EADI Executive Committee member, which held a conference in Vienna in January 2015 on Tax Justice for Social Justice[2].

The conference brought together activists, practitioners and scholars from many countries. They discussed several issues concerning tax justice; such as how the fiscal rewards of globalization are distributed among and within countries, and to what extent new international regulatory frameworks can support developing countries in dealing with multinational companies, tax competition among countries, tax evasion and corruption. Vincent concluded that, although the financial support for tax systems in ODA was less than 0.1% between 2004-2012, this is an essential area for donors to support, together with a focus on fighting tax havens, bank secrecy, and the promotion of fiscal responsibility within the private sector.

The second perspective concerned the ways in which the various 'new' EU member states have dealt with issues such as their new roles as donors and with international cooperation. Horký-Hlucháň showed that central and Eastern European countries took different routes regarding international cooperation, depending on whether they had become EU members or not[3]. Those that had, developed two main discourses; linking their work to the MDGs (now SDGs) and focusing on Africa, or focusing on human rights (e.g. Poland). Horký-Hlucháň suggested that the new member countries have a unique contribution to make to EU discussions on development cooperation, as a result of their own recent transition processes; the experiences from their transition could be translated into useful guidelines for other transitions as suggested to developing countries in development cooperation programmes. However, there is little recognition of the eastern European experience among EU donors at the moment, which may be a missed opportunity.

Pavlík provided an interesting case study of the Czech Republic, which shows how one of the 'new' EU members has dealt with the transition from being a recipient of aid from various European programmes to becoming the largest donor of development aid among the new EU member states. Originally Czechoslovakia, the predecessor of the Czech Republic, was a development aid donor under the Soviet controlled aid regime, and this also included military aid. In that period Czechoslovakia was not autonomous in its decisions concerning aid, and they were centrally controlled. In the subsequent process of accession to the EU, the Czech Republic became the first country to once again become a development aid donor. Pavlík however, also discussed the aid that the Czech Republic received in its process of accession from the PHARE programme, which assisted it to build up its institutions according to the EU requirements for accession (as well as those from other European and international institutions). The development aid policy of the Czech Republic is quite focused and follows key areas of the SDG goals, and has a designated development agency to oversee the programme.

The Olomouc conference provided interesting perspectives on global and development issues, and brought together scholars working on global issues from various perspectives. It also showed that the history of the 'new' EU member states can provide a twist to the SDGs by including experiences from their recent 'transitions' in order to inform ideas concerning the current transformations on which all of us are working.

References

Ondrej Horký-Hlucháň and Simon Lightfoot (2015). Development Cooperation of the 'New' EU Member States; Beyond Europeanization. EADI Book Series, Palgrave MacMillan.

Notes

[1] A large number of publications of various types were presented, and provided very useful insights into the issues taken up.

[2] Coordinated by EADI and the Global Alliance for Tax Justice, and hosted by the Vienna Institute for International Dialogue and Cooperation and the Department of Development Studies of the Vienna University

[3] His presentation was linked to his recently published book, Development Cooperation of the 'New' EU Member States; Beyond Europeanization, in the EADI Book Series.

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Knowledge management in urban governance; building adaptive capacity through ICT-GIS-based systems in the global South

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Abstract

Knowledge management (KM) in local governance processes is being transformed through digitization (ICT), spatialization (GIS), and participatory processes; the question is whether this increases the potential for building adaptive capacity and inclusivity. The question is linked to discussions on how knowledge construction and circulation can improve competences in local government, make urban planning more knowledge-based, and provide greater recognition of citizens' knowledge (accountability). Local governance networks need such instruments in building adaptive capacity, and in dealing with increasing complexity and uncertainty. By utilizing the results from extended case studies in six medium-sized cities in India, South Africa, Brazil, and Peru, all participating in the Chance2Sustain research network, we examine how uneven technological and organisational changes are transforming the ways in which local government works. Knowledge management in urban governance is configured through several issues: 1) discourses for digitizing KM in local urban development; 2) actor networks producing socio-spatial knowledge; 3) embedding KM in decision-making processes (power struggles, exclusion); and 4) influences of KM on work practices, interfaces with citizens, and organisational outcomes.

The results show that 1) KM discourses concerned four issues: strategic urban planning and integrated land use planning; geographic boundaries in urban development discourses; streamlining work processes, and mapping needs assessments; 2) initiatives mainly link government with the private sector; 3) codified and technical knowledge remain dominant in discussions on urban development; and 4) although efficiency is improved, transparency and accountability to citizens remain limited. Generally, KM is not used strategically for dealing with future complexity and uncertainty.

Key words: knowledge management, urban governance, digital systems, cities

Introduction

Recent discussions on urban development have given increasing importance to the role of knowledge construction, circulation and utilization (e.g. McFarlane 2011; McCann and Ward, 2011; Campbell 2012). Such discussions are set against the background of global urbanization, discussions on the extent to which cities draw on resources and contribute to economic growth, as well as environmental concerns.

Several debates deal with the issues surrounding knowledge. Most are dominated theoretically by urban contexts in the global North, leaving wide gaps in understanding how cities in emerging economies deal with knowledge management. As future urbanization will be concentrated in the global South, greater attention to changing knowledge management in cities there is needed (Robinson 2006). Several processes are currently transforming knowledge management: the expansion of information and communication technology infrastructure (ICT), the spatialization of information through the use of geo-technologies (geographic information systems, real-time monitoring with GPS), and interfaces with citizens through open-access platforms (e.g. Google Earth) (Pfeffer et al. 2015; Georgiadou and Stoter 2010).

In this article we raise the question of how the digitization and spatialization of knowledge management (KM) is transforming urban governance in six medium-size cities in India, Brazil, South Africa and Peru[1]. Local governments need such instruments in dealing with the increasing complexity of their mandates, and in addressing social inequalities and economic growth, in a context of increasing environmental and economic uncertainty. This question fits into broader discussions on how urban governance networks can build their adaptive capacity through KM, improving their competences (efficiency and effective processes), and providing greater accountability to their citizens (cf. McCall and Dunn 2012; McCall, Martinez, Verplanke, 2014). The debates within which our question fits are discussed briefly here.

The first debate concerns how discourses on urban development and policy mobility develop. Such discourses have three main themes. The first focuses on changing mandates for urban local authorities, particularly the shift from managerial to entrepreneurial policies among local governments. The second focuses on how local governments can build facilities for middle classes and professionals, and implicitly discusses how to deal with inequalities and differing levels of urban citizenship. The third theme focuses on how knowledge travels in policy mobility, with the Internet potentially stimulating exchanges globally. The general debate is dominated by the global city networks research, where the substantive focus is on economic growth and providing facilities for middle-class lifestyles (Brenner 2004; McCann and Ward, 2011; Kennedy et al. 2011). Although social inequalities are recognized, discourses about informal settlements are usually negative, and policies focus on implementing ‘slum-free cities’ (Davis, 2006).

International city networks are seen as means for knowledge/policy mobility, incorporating various knowledge sources through networks of professionals across sectors, organizations and geographic locations (McCann and Ward, 2011).

This debate has several gaps. Emphasizing urban growth ignores urban inequalities and how to reduce them, although extensive poverty and informal settlements exist in Southern cities. In knowledge networks and policy mobility, there is an implicit assumption of universal access to the Internet and information sharing. However, access to information and knowledge provides power in policy-making, so that assumption is unlikely to be true (Baud and de Wit, 2008).

The second debate concerns the networks involved in managing and planning cities, and the knowledge produced and circulated in that context (transparency, accountability). A major concern is the actors who are involved in city policymaking, and their power to express their priorities. The discussion has focused on coalitions between local authorities and the private sector (regime theory); and relations between local state and civil society (e.g. Cornwall and Gaventa, 2001; Gaventa 2006). The main issue concerns the power that civil society organizations have in order to ensure that their visions of urban development and the needs of marginalized social groups are included. Deliberative processes have provided platforms for developing stronger forms of citizenship (Heller 2009). 'Negotiated spaces' facilitate discussions between urban residents and local governments, although the channels and degrees of power remain quite variable and differ for the middle class and marginalized residents (cf. Baud and Nainan 2008; Shatkin 2007). Such spaces provide platforms for bringing citizen-based contextual-embedded knowledge into political discussions within networks (Scott and Barnett 2009).

The third debate concerns how knowledge is built, exchanged, and contested in urban KM (cf. Harvey and Tulloch 2006; Kahila and Kyttä 2009). Current discussions focus both on how spatialized knowledge is produced and how local government is transformed through digitization. The former discusses how mapping processes incorporate specific points of views in their topics (Kitchin et al. 2013; Wood, 2012; Monmonnier 1991). It adds to our knowledge of concentrations of poverty, crime, health and environmental vulnerabilities (Baud et al. 2008; Martinez 2009; Pfeffer et al., 2012). The latter provides governments with the opportunity to streamline work processes and make their work more effective, and to be more transparent and accountable to the citizens (e.g. Martinez, Pfeffer and van Dijk 2011)[2].

Utilizing knowledge management for local governments is increasingly important in the face of future volatility in economic growth and possible shocks, expected impacts of climate change in the availability of basic resources (water, energy) and the complexity of such changes. It implies that building an adaptive capacity within local governments is quite strategic in order to deal with the issues above (cf. Peyroux et al, 2014; Hordijk and Baud 2011).

Configuring knowledge management in urban governance

This article concerns how knowledge management (KM) within urban governance is becoming transformed through digitization (the use of ICT) and spatialized through the use of geographic information systems (GIS). It focuses specifically on KM, in which local governments play a central role, both within government and in interaction with citizens. We examine how different types of knowledge are incorporated into governance processes (cf. Pfeffer et al. 2011; Hordijk and Baud 2011; McCall and Dunn 2012), as well as the extent to which spatial dimensions are included in such knowledge-building processes (e.g. GIS-based; maps, visualisations)[3]. Finally, we examine mainly digitized processes of knowledge management; hybrid KM systems, with several modes of interaction (mobile phones, internet, face2face) coordinated by municipal administrations (Richter 2014)[4].

The main concept we utilize is that of a (spatial) knowledge management configuration with the following dimensions:

1) discourses about (spatial) knowledge management,
2) actor networks /coalitions producing and using spatial knowledge and their relations,
3) embedding knowledge management in decision-making processes (exchange and contestation),
4) changes in work processes and outcomes resulting from the use of spatial KM.

We are specifically interested in the introduction of digitized information, electronic platforms, and GIS-based systems in local government, and to what extent digital KM activities are linked between line departments (water, town planning, public works), and interfaces with citizens[5]. We see the production of knowledge as a relational process, where power, internal capacity, competency issues and external competition may hinder knowledge exchanges (e.g. Giezen, 2012; Healey 2007; McFarlane 2008). We use the term ICT-GIS-based for various products based on new modes of communication (internet, mobile phone) and/or which have a spatial dimension (geographic location, visualisations).

This paper presents the results of six extended city case studies, carried out within the Chance2Sustain project[6]. The case studies utilized the research dimensions above, for which data was collected by national research teams through structured and informal interviews with key actors[7]. The full reports of the case studies are available online at the EADI-Chance2Sustain website (http://www.chance2sustain.eu).

In comparing ICT-GIS-based knowledge across cities we consider the specificities of their historical contexts in order to provide “nuanced, complex, contextual accounts” (Robinson, 2011). Using the relational concept of comparison means that we do not measure our ‘cases’ against a universal yardstick, but “consider both similar and different urban outcomes” (Robinson, 2011: 13). Below, the six cities are briefly set in their context (Table 1).

Table 1. City contexts of case study locations

City	Main context features
Callao, Peru	Mandatory concertación processes[8] Pro-growth & pro-poor agenda Strong concentration of industrial-service sectors in region High level of urbanization Social inclusion and public participation Institutional restructuring – improving local capacity City within Lima agglomeration
Cape Town, Durban, South Africa	Post-apartheid transformation – legislative and policy reform Pro-growth & pro-poor agenda Institutional restructuring – lack of capacity at local level Spatial restructuring (in Durban- inclusion of large peri-urban area post-2002) Excellent financial management Good record of service delivery Deeply entrenched spatial inequality High level of urbanization
Guarulhos, Brazil	High level of urbanization High economic activity – services and industry Spatial inequality and segregation Pro-growth & pro-poor agenda Social inclusion and public participation Institutional restructuring – improving local capacity Spatial restructuring – inclusion of peri-urban/poor areas Good financial management Good record of service delivery
Kalyan Dombivili, India	Peri-urban city in urban agglomeration – high level of urbanization Pro-growth & pro-poor agenda Spatial inequality between Kalyan and Dombivili Municipal boundary restructuring Institutional restructuring – improving local capacity Entrenched financial management Improving service delivery but still uneven Pioneer in e-Governance
Chennai, India	Metro-agglomeration and major port driven by IT-BPO and car industry Acute water, electricity and mass transport shortages Corporation area expanded Pioneer in e-Governance Online bill & tax payment

The following sections set out the case study results by configuration dimension.

Discourses/rationales for introducing ICT-GIS-based spatial knowledge management

Several discourses were used as rationales for the introduction of ICT-GIS-based KM in local governance, linked to how local governments work in their specific contexts. They relate to four issues:

a) Strategic urban planning and integrated land use planning;

b) Determining geographic boundaries as a pre-condition for more effective planning and urban development discourse;

c) Streamlining work processes of local governments and relations with other levels of government, citizens and the private sector;

d) Poverty/needs assessment, mapping and location of facilities (Table 2).

Table 2. Rationales for introducing ICT-GIS KM systems

	Strategic urban planning/ integrated land use planning	Determining geographic boundaries;	Streamlining work processes LG	Poverty, needs assessment & location of facilities[9]
Callao	x	x		
Guarulhos	x		x	x
Durban	x	x		x
Cape Town	x	x		x
Kalyan			x	x
Chennai		x	x	x

X= this rationale was found in the city concerned

Strategic urban planning and integrated land use planning

A first rationale for using ICT-GIS-based KM concerns strategic urban planning and integrated land use planning. This was found mainly in the South African and Peruvian cities, in contrast to India where this discourse was largely lacking (Table 2)[10].

In South Africa, after the 1994 change of government, a transformative vision was developed of a reduction in the existing spatial segregation and in the inequalities linked to apartheid policies. Now, urban strategic planning by local and provincial governments includes a strong spatial perspective, in which the Spatial Development Framework provides guidance for future urban development (Watson 2002). In Durban and Cape Town,

strategic urban planning utilizes the notion of the 'compact city', where high population density facilitates the building of facilities and services, and a spatially defined 'urban development line' limits the area where the full range are provided. In Cape Town, the 'coastal edge' added to the recent spatial development framework (SDF, 2012) demarcates coastal zone areas with environmental risks, and limited future development. Strategic planning in South Africa has also started to include discourses concerning competitive, managed cities through the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) policy, with a greater market influence on spatial forms. Examples are the "private-sector-driven, up-market, commercial and residential" gated developments such as the aerotropolis in Durban and Century City in Cape Town (Harrison et al., 2009: 139).

Integrated land use planning involves processes in which geo-referenced databases from different sources support policy choices (found in Cape Town, Durban, Callao, Guarulhos, and Chennai). In each case, different actors and processes are involved.

In Durban and Cape Town, urban spatial planning was revolutionized in the 1990s by the linking of digital databases and maps, and the provision of fairly up-to-date maps which showed the spatial spread of urban phenomena, and assisted in decision-making.

In Peru the regional government of Callao works on the integration of land use planning together with several municipalities bordering Lima city and including parts of the Lima metropolitan region[11]. It is a leader in developing ICT-GIS-based KM systems for local governments, and in integrating regional planning based on three knowledge processes; spatial planning, determining boundaries, and specific reports on issues of concern. For spatial planning, documents are prepared collectively by the Callao regional government, working with line departments of its government, local governments, NGOs and knowledge institutes (MIP) in a *concertación* process[12]. Delineating boundaries in a common database was a precondition in making planning feasible and in reducing contestation. Publicly accessible reports on specific topics provide a deeper understanding on specific issues and can be used as a basis for decision-making.

In Guarulhos, Brazil integrated land use planning has been a major municipal concern. They collect, organize, and analyze (spatial) data to inform their urban development policy, which has attracted municipal investments to peri-urban and poorly serviced areas for greater social inclusion. Although Guarulhos is the second largest municipality in the state, it remains a small player in the SP metropolitan region[13]. Its Development Plan 2004 defined five geographic zones, setting out broad terms for economic development, environmental protection and social responsibility. A new development plan translates those terms into concrete issues; utilizing improved data production and administrative modernization. The result is that discussions between government departments, professional associations and private sector interests in the city are now based on reliable figures.

Determining municipal boundaries

A second discourse concerns how boundaries for urban development strategies are established when KM is digitized and spatialized. Boundaries (of plots in the city) have to be established more accurately when linking databases to base maps in GIS for city planning.

In South Africa the establishment of physical boundaries is a much-contested process and includes extensive public participation. In Durban the redrawing of municipal administrative boundaries was part of the post-1994 spatial restructuring, and brought marginal areas into larger municipal entities to reduce the effects of spatial segregation (Durban became the eThekwini Municipality). The main idea was that changing municipal boundaries would facilitate cross-subsidization and smooth out inequalities. The new boundaries were integrated into databases and base maps for the planning of urban developments, and the results from the 2002 Census allowed the systematic mapping of existing urban inequalities.

In Peru the precise demarcation of boundaries between municipalities in the constitutional province of Callao in preparation for the ICT-GIS system was a pre-condition for current spatial planning processes, which are directed towards ecological economic micro-zoning and the spatial management plan. Currently, the provincial government is working with the municipalities to develop background reports for further detailed planning processes linked to major issues in the area.

City boundaries are also redrawn by economic expansion which occurs through or despite city development plans, which exist in all case studies[14]. However, where economic growth is fuelled by private developers, city borders are changed as governments come to terms with the new status quo. In Chennai, India where the 'IT corridor' south of the city has dominated economic growth, city borders were extended in 2011 by the state government to include large parts of the southern corridor, ensuring that the substantial revenues from the included areas would go to city government.

This discussion shows that digitizing spatial knowledge on boundaries requires more accurate, up-to-date and non-contested information to support urban planning and development. Whereas SA had the instruments in place at a sophisticated level, these had to be developed in Peru by initiatives at the provincial level, and Brazil and India are still in the process of being developed at local levels[15].

Work processes in local government: Administrative efficiency and effectiveness

A third discourse on the introduction of digitized and spatial knowledge concerns improvements in efficiency and effectiveness. This discourse is very strong in India, where the focus of e-governance initiatives has been designed to improve work processes in order to enhance access and delivery of government services to citizens, employees and the managements of urban local bodies, while aiming to strengthen effective governance

and increase transparency (JNNURM, Mandatory primer 1, e-Governance, ULB reform, n.d.). The lack of accurate and up-to-date databases, among other issues, has hampered urban local governments in India from having efficient and effective revenue collections and from being able to monitor developments in their cities; this lack has prevented residents from exercising their citizenship rights effectively and has allowed informal (corrupt) practices to become extensive (Roy 2009). Initiatives for digitization and spatializing information within local government have been very uneven in Indian cities; our case study cities Kalyan Dombivili and Chennai were early innovators.

Poverty and needs assessment mapping and locating facilities

Cities have also used digitized and spatialized knowledge to map deprived areas in order to rationalize budget allocations to those urban areas with the most pressing needs; a rationale found in both Durban and Cape Town in South Africa. The Infrastructure Branch of the eThekwini municipality has developed a composite deprivation index to analyze the spatial concentration of deprivations, and developed two GIS models as tools for strategic decision-making: the 'Access to Services' model and the Cost Surface model[16]. Both tools provide basic spatial information for decision-making on the location of infrastructure. The models reduce unit costs in promoting a compact city, help determine facility prioritization for informal settlements, and reduce political pressure on location choices. This model is now used in decision-making in both cities, and in Cape Town more integrated decision-making processes across municipal line functions are being promoted.

In India a national programme for urban poverty reduction and slum eradication (RAY), incorporates GIS-based slum mapping in its procedures. The plans are intended to be participative and involve residents and NGOs/CBOs in guiding community mobilization activities for Slum Surveys, data validation, and slum-level redevelopment/ upgrading models. In practice, slum mapping in pilot projects is currently done by consultant firms. In Chennai slums in five zones were surveyed, but the survey met with resistance from residents, who have little faith in such processes (Sekhar, Hindu, December 15, 2012)[17].

Actor networks producing and using knowledge

This section discusses the main actor networks that are building digital and spatial knowledge management configurations. In our case study cities the main actors are government departments at different levels, working individually or with hybrid networks (Table 3). They mainly work closely with private sector companies. Cooperation with universities as knowledge institutions is less institutionalized. Urban residents are only recognized as knowledge producers in consultation processes and in feedback processes to local governments.

Table 3. Actor networks in producing ICT-GIS initiatives

Case study cities	Local/ government levels	Private sector	Universities	Citizens (NGOs)
Callao	x (regional)	x		x
Guarulhos	x	x	x mainly in environment	not integrated with municipal
Durban (eThekwini)	x	x	x (MoU)	x
Cape Town	x	x	x(African Centre	X
Kalyan Dombivili	x	x	x (technical advice)	x (e-grievances)
Chennai	x	x	x (technical univer-	

In Peru the Callao regional government (Constitutional province) has established a strong regional network with local municipalities, the private sector and NGOs, and works with other actors in exchanging knowledge through online information systems concerned with regional and local issues (concertación process) in an inclusive manner.

In Guarulhos, Brazil local government is spatializing and digitizing information, and has informal links with a university for environmental issues. The national spatial data infrastructure (INDE) sets out the context and the national bureau of statistics (IBGE) provides socio-economic data and map layers for local government to produce GIS-based maps.

The City of Cape Town has widened its network by working with the African Centre for Cities (ACC). A series of 'city labs' facilitate engagement between academics and city officials. Durban Municipality has recently started working with its University (UKZN) and allows academics to undertake applied research with municipal officials on projects which benefit the city.

In India Kalyan Dombivili was an early innovator in promoting e-governance (1999) and is now a model for other local governments in Maharashtra. Although local government is the initiator, they work with private sector companies who are very influential in determining the level of expertise implemented by local government.

Local government in Chennai initiated an integrated digitization project with a private company in the late nineties. However, the complexity of the project led to it being scaled down after several years. Recent initiatives to link local government, development authorities and state government departments in one network to develop integrated ICT-GIS systems were also not successful.

Knowledge exchange and contestation

A basic rationale for digitizing and spatializing knowledge is the opportunity to exchange and coordinate it for more effective local governance. However, the extent of equal access and the contestation of knowledge are issues of concern.

The results showed a lack of knowledge sharing among municipal departments, which limits the possibilities of integrating the mapping of issues for strategic urban planning (e.g. such as is used in Callao and Durban). In Durban data files are held on a central server and are shared by line departments; each department can build on this central database with data relevant to their own function. In Callao a similar regional infrastructure provides information across municipalities. In Guarulhos a joint municipal geo-portal is being developed for limited data exchange between departments. In India the majority of projects are cocooned within their own organization and within a GIS department. In Kalyan Dombivili the lack of information shared between municipal departments means that the opportunity of integrating information on social policy, environmental issues and revenue collection is lost.

Secondly, results showed that exchanges can be limited and contested when local governments use the private sector as consultants. In Kalyan Dombivili private consultants can analyze the data and prevent such capacity building among municipal staff. In Durban influential GIS consultants are commissioned to analyze spatial data and provide the ability to use knowledge to a greater advantage.

Thirdly, staff in various organizations can undermine the potential transparency of such systems. This particularly applies in situations where KM provides monitoring systems of payments by urban residents, and staff input records of such payments. Existing forms of corruption are threatened by ICT-GIS, and therefore their introduction and correct use is resisted. Audits of e-governance in KD and Chennai have signalled such issues.

Fourthly, there is a limited input of community knowledge. In Durban and Kalyan Dombivili (middle-class) residents provide feedback through digital grievance systems (Martinez et al 2011). In both localities input from poorer communities is limited as it is filtered through councillors who represent communities in participatory processes. That system remains vulnerable to political manipulation. The fifth issue is whether GIS provides valid and reliable knowledge for decision-making. In Durban the Infrastructure Unit promotes GIS as 'objective' knowledge which allows facilities to be located and the prioritizing of service provision free from political influence. However, such databases need to be validated. This includes the validity of indicators used, the reliability and accuracy of data input, and the regular updates of data inputs[18].

Conclusions: effects of using spatial knowledge management (SKM) for urban development

In conclusion we come back to our main question of how knowledge management (KM) within urban governance is being transformed by digitization and spatialization, and its effects on urban development strategies. KM configurations consist of several dimensions: 1) the discourses around digitized KM and types of information/knowledge acknowledged; 2) the networks of actors producing socio-spatial knowledge; 3) the embedding of KM in decision-making processes; and 4) the effects of KM on work practices and outcomes.

The discourses for introducing ICT-GIS based knowledge management were many and varied, including cities, organizations and their mandates. The discourses concerned four issues: strategic urban planning and integrated land use planning; determining geographic boundaries in urban development; streamlining work processes of local governments, and mapping poverty and needs assessments. This suggests that in the South the main rationale for using digitized and spatialized knowledge is focused on gaining firmer control of complex urban development processes, by establishing non-contestable boundaries and expanding urban land use planning databases. This focus is strategic for future economic growth, but also provides possible inputs for prioritization in improving basic services and reducing inequalities. Importantly, knowledge management was geared towards increasing government competences in raising revenues, reducing corrupt work practices, and improving management information systems.

The actors generally recognised as producing knowledge in urban planning and management are mainly governments working with the private sector. Initiatives are national, local and regional. The strongest networks in the development of ICT-GIS initiatives are found between local government and the private sector. However, the technical expertise of the private sector means that their power over local government is strong, and likely to grow, as the 'smart city' discourse requires technical expertise outside local government competencies. Links with knowledge institutes and civil society organisations in developing knowledge management are weaker.

The main sectors in which ICT-GIS based knowledge management was introduced concern strategic planning, tax assessment and collection, and locating facilities. Some initiatives for greater interaction with urban residents were found; an increased access to administrative information through websites and through grievance feedback systems. However, these were mainly used by middle-class residents; low-income residents still work through political representatives.

Generally, spatial knowledge platforms and mapping products are strongly dominated by experts using and producing codified and technical information products. This information is positioned as objective, but is occasionally contested. Several examples of civil society initiatives in building ICT-GIS-based knowledge platforms and databases were found in the city case studies (see Pfeffer et al. 2013). In addition, more deliberative processes in Lima show that creating 'spaces' for more interactive processes contributes to mutual knowledge building (Miranda Sara, Pfeffer and Baud, 2016). Also the regular interaction in Durban between citizen initiatives and city experts leads to exchanges of information and mutual knowledge.

Knowledge exchange remains a difficult issue. Even within government, knowledge does not travel well between departments and different levels of government. Knowledge sharing is scarce and in some contexts there is active resistance to the digitizing of internal databases due to the fear that greater transparency and control will reveal incompetence

and corruption. However, some initiatives are being undertaken in this area. Knowledge exchange and feedback from residents is usually limited and confined to strict guidelines. However, counter-mapping issues elsewhere are opening up through NGOs (e.g. Cheqeado.com in Argentina, Ushahidi in Africa).

The main conclusion is that building ICT-GIS based knowledge management configurations is very uneven across cities, sectors and countries. Although a variety of rationales exist for doing so, related to discourses on urban growth, effective urban management, and reducing inequalities, a great deal of effort is still needed to implement digitized and spatialized knowledge management in such a way that it includes a range of knowledge – including from citizens - effectively used in urban planning and management in many cities in emerging economies.

This means that the adaptive capacity of local governments is still limited as they lack the full range of databases over time to support longer-term urban development strategies, and do not yet have interactive processes in place, which would provide more community -embedded knowledge for future decision-making.

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Notes

[1] This article is a shortened and adapted version of the Baud et al. article in Habitat International 2014, entitled "Digital and spatial knowledge management in urban governance: Emerging issues in India, Brazil, South Africa, and Peru".

[2] Major questions within this debate are whether the digitization and spatialization of information and knowledge empower citizens (transparency and accountability) or whether such tools increase levels of surveillance (Prins, Broeders and Griffioen 2012).

[3] For a definition of tacit, codified and contextual-embedded knowledge, please refer to van Ewijk and Baud (2009) and the literature review of WP5 (Baud et al. 2011).

[4] "About 60% of the Indian population have mobile phones, but there are only about 2 million active users of mobile Internet services – less than 0.1% of the population." (Wright et al., 2010: 8).

[5] The introduction of ICT-GIS-based KM systems influences work processes and interfaces with citizens in planning processes, administrative processes, interactive processes which provide feedback from citizens, and in the CSO-based construction of community knowledge (cf. Pfeffer et al. 2012).

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[7] In addition, post-graduate students carried out 2-3 months fieldwork concerned with similar topics in the various cities.

[8] Concertación is the process in which stakeholders work together toward final outcomes.

[9] In Peru this is done at the national level and provided to local governments.

[10] In Chennai the Development Authorities have their own GIS section, which provides maps for the Master Plan.

[11] This area is strategic in terms of economic activities (harbour, airport, industry), as well as environmentally important (coastal zone), with higher levels of immigration than elsewhere.

[12] They include the report on delineating and determining territorial boundaries in the Constitutional province of Callao, zoning for spatial demarcation, the organization of the district of Ventanilla, and reports on human settlements (Mercedes Mi Peru, Porcino Park project, a report on all settlements in Callao, and one on hazards in human settlements in Callao province).

[13] This is the result of the size of the city of Sao Paulo itself, as well as of the institutional challenges to the orchestration of action plans by a metropolitan body.

[14] In Kalyan Dombivili the CDP of 2011; in Chennai the 2009 CDP Review; in Guarulhos the Macro-zoning plan of 2004; in Durban the Spatial development Frameworks in 2002, 2008 and 2011; in Cape Town the SDF of 2012.

[15] In India in particular the establishment of land boundaries is an ongoing process with high levels of contestation (Collabland, p.c. NIT-Chennai 2013).

[16] The 'Access to Services' model models the supply of and demand for social facilities across the Metropolitan area and is able to predict the future social services requirements for housing. The 'Cost Surface' Model predicts the cost of servicing any piece of land in the city.

[17] This programme was discontinued by the new Modi government in 2014, and was replaced by the Smart Cities programme.

[18] In India eligibility for food subsidies is determined by households' 'below the poverty line (bpl)' status, determined both by political access as well as income levels. Databases on bpl households therefore reflect a set of mixed criteria, making them invalid for poverty mapping.

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The History and Politics of Human Mobility

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Abstract

This contribution reflects upon different aspects of human mobility throughout history as well as the way how they relate to politics. It briefly describes important moments in the European history of migration, including the periods of Antiquity, Middle Ages and the contemporary history. This paper argues that human mobility has been present throughout history and is a natural phenomenon. Since ancient times, large-scale migrations, motivated in most cases by demographic developments and climatic changes, have substantially determined the shape of the contemporary world. The freedom of movement has been one of the important facets of societies throughout history. However, in the 20th century, with the rise of different kinds of freedoms, the freedom of movement has shrunk. The technology which accompanies mobility and restricts it is also something new. This article concludes by discussing the issue of human mobility and its relation to politics and takes into account the recent developments in the European Union.

Key words: human mobility, history of migration, refugees, asylum

Introduction

Most global problems (globalization, population growth or ecological crisis) scare us not only because of their potential risks and threats, but also because we do not know their history. If we examine their history better, it will help us perceive the problems more realistically and resolve them rationally. Without a doubt, this also applies to migration, which is raising so many concerns in today's Europe. As one of the most prominent scholars on human mobility Tim Cresswell (2010: 29) put it, "We cannot understand new mobilities then, without understanding old mobilities. Thinking of mobilities in terms of constellations of movements, representations and practices helps us avoid historical amnesia when thinking about and with mobility." Migration is almost as old as human history and has not always been a negative or significantly abnormal phenomenon. International migration is a rare event both in an individual's life and on a global scale. Despite the record numbers of people currently forced to move due to conflicts, the majority of these people stay within the boundaries of their own state and become internally displaced. Globally, there are twice as many internally displaced persons as there are refugees. The statistics currently indicate that 3.3% of people move across international borders and this number has stayed roughly the same over recent decades (United Nations, 2015).

This paper aims to illustrate the continuation of the past into the present and will begin by outlining the changing circumstances of mobility through history. It argues that history and politics have always been inextricably linked to mobility and that movement

is related to power and resources. We would like to assert that migration is part and parcel of what it means to be human. *Homo migrans* has always been present throughout history, from antiquity to the modern era and the situation we are currently witnessing in Europe is not unique. However, we are facing enormous pressures which are testing the limits of human mobility on a global scale; a phenomenon that has only been introduced relatively recently. Before the First World War, people could move freely, without passports. After the war, nation states decided to control people's legitimate means of movement (Torpey, 2000).

The history of *homo migrans*

Through migration, new continents were populated and the present-day political, ethnic and cultural map of the world was created. The German migration historian Klaus J. Bade (2003: IX) states, *"'Homo migrans' has existed just as long as 'Homo sapiens', as moving from place to place is a condition of human existence – similar to births, diseases and deaths. Migrations as social processes are – if we disregard flights (escapes) and forced migrations – a response to more or less complex economic, environmental, social and cultural conditions of human existence. Therefore, the history of migrations is a part of general history and can only be understood in the context of general history."* For members of the oldest prehistoric societies of hunters and gatherers, migration was essentially a natural way of life. It was not before the gradual transition to agriculture – and the related settled way of life in the period of the Neolithic Revolution – and the subsequent birth of the oldest civilizations, already organized into the form of states, that humans discovered the concept of home with a link or tie to a single place and community.

The permanent settlement and the notion of home was starting to represent a significantly positive value and expulsion from home (e.g. as a result of very serious wrongdoing or illness – such as leprosy in ancient times and in the Middle Ages) was considered as one of the most severe punishments, a fatal stigma. Throughout our cultural history, since ancient times and up until today, an uprooted individual without a home has been viewed either as a hopeless creature struck by fate or, in contrast, as a suspicious and morally untrustworthy being. A vagrant, an uprooted homeless person, an uprooted wanderer became a cultural and literary archetype. Conversely, a homeless existence, a life on the road, was a sign of protest against a settled society, an escape to freedom. In contrast, for rebels against society, all those who were viewed by the settled society with mistrust (in the Middle Ages they were vagrants and wandering students, in later ages they were, for example, wandering comedians, grocers, migrating Gypsies and more recently tramps, American beatniks and hippies) became the embodiment of freedom, the symbol of a totally unrestrained lifestyle. From ancient times to the present, sedentary societies have viewed with mistrust and suspicion the nomads and unsettled, migratory tribes and nations that lived in their immediate neighborhood, and which often posed serious military and political threats to these societies (e.g. the Greeks and the Romans included them among the so-called "Barbarians"). Using selected examples of migration from ancient

times to the early Middle Ages, we would like to show the complexity of the problem, as well as the fact that it is not always a problem, as it can sometimes be a benefit.

Since ancient times, large-scale migrations, motivated in most cases by demographic developments and climatic changes, have substantially determined the shape of the contemporary world. The following examples taken from the history of the Middle East and Europe illustrate the link between demographic developments, environment, and the progress or collapse of various civilizations. For example, an extensive migration and invasion of the Sea Peoples around 1200 B.C. resulted in the devastation of the entire eastern Mediterranean, the burning down of Phoenician cities, the break up of the Hittite Empire and serious danger for Egypt. One of these Sea Peoples, *the Philistines* (as described in the Bible), gave the name to a country called Palestine. In the same way, only slightly later, an invasion of the Dorians destroyed the advanced civilization of Mycenaean Greece. Some of the migrations of ancient times have become truly legendary (e.g. the exodus of the Jews from Egypt to the "promised land").

Other migrations were forced and were actually deportations ordered, particularly by the kings of the ancient Near-East empires (the Babylonians, the Assyrians), for the purposes of easier control over subjugated populations (e.g. the well-known Assyrian and Babylonian capture of the Jews). A similar policy towards the Jews and other nations was, to a certain extent, pursued by the Romans. Following the suppression of Jewish revolts between 66 and 70 A.D., particularly the Bar Kokhba revolt between 132 and 135 A.D., the Jews were forbidden to enter the territory of Jerusalem and a large proportion of them were forced to leave the territory of Judea, which contributed to a significant strengthening of the Jewish diaspora. Thus, not only did a life in diaspora become the destiny of the Jewish people, but it also – thanks to the talent and advanced intellectual culture of the Jewish nation – enriched all societies where the Jews were present. Environmental causes were behind the migrations of the Maya people around the 9th century B.C. and a long time before that, of the population of the once green Sahara (Hughes, 2001). Their gradual exodus from an advancing desert that was expanding as a consequence of a global climatic change and also partly because of their intrusive agricultural techniques (especially pasturage) eventually reached as far as the Nile valley and gave rise to the ancient Egyptian civilization.

"Multiculturalism" in Antiquity

Migration also contributed to the significant growth and enrichment of classical ancient culture. From this historical territory, evolving Greek culture spread through large migration waves known as the "Great Greek Colonization". As a consequence of the rapid economic growth of Greek municipalities as early as the beginning of the Archaic period of Greek history and the related population growth, the free population of these municipalities had to look for new settlements. Climatically favorable, but suffering from a lack of arable land and other resources,

Greek territory was not able to sustain the growing population. During the great colonization period, the Greeks populated the Black Sea region, the Western Mediterranean (the so-called "Magna Graecia" or Great Greece) and part of north Africa. Many of these Greek colonies laid the foundations for the later important European cities (Marseille, Naples, Varna, Odessa, Constanța.

Migration actually played as many as three roles: first, it was a natural demographic outlet which could prevent potential social unrest; second, it enabled Greeks to obtain valuable resources of agricultural land, wood and minerals; and third, it supported civilization exchange. Thanks to this migration, the Greeks adopted the Phoenician alphabet and gained extensive natural scientific knowledge from the Orient and, in return, they enriched the cultures of a number of other peoples (the Etruscans, the Romans, the Italic tribes). The intensity of the migration and the related cultural exchange can be seen by the remarkable fact that the oldest known evidence of the Greek alphabet, which originated from the Phoenician alphabet on the Levantine coast, comes from as far away as the island of Ischia off the Italian coast and is from the 9th century B.C. In particular during the Hellenistic and Roman Greece periods, migration led to a fundamental transformation and an interconnection of the world. Nevertheless, the situation began to change quickly and dynamically in the Hellenistic period and then with the relatively rapid Hellenization of Rome. The Mediterranean world had become interconnected as never before, a real Mediterranean ecumene was taking form, mainly through military invasions (the last wave of Greek colonization was in connection with Alexander's campaign) and, in particular, through mutual trade. This situation is vividly described by the well-known archaeologist and historian Gordon Childe (1960: 145): *"Goods and their producers were dispersed across the whole Hellenistic world. In every port, in every metropolis, colonies of foreigners were arising and especially the Jews were omnipresent. Thus, we can read about an Indian merchant settled in Egypt who, even at that time, held a ministerial office. The guild of Syrian merchants operated a proper hotel on Delos, which offered lodgings, a storage area, a conference room and a chapel. A contract is still preserved between a resident of Massalia* (today's Marseille) *and a Spartan, who were partners during a business voyage to Ethiopia. Also, a free labour force was mobile as never before. An Italian coppersmith processing bronze moved his trade from Lucania to Rhodes, while a silk processor from Antioch died in Naples."*

Besides economic and labour mobility, people also travelled for the purpose of study (especially the Romans to Greece) and for recreation and exploration, i.e. a predecessor of modern tourism. An important consequence of this mobility was the formation of a cosmopolitan, racially, ethnically and culturally, mixed society. Even though some researchers regard this racial mix which took place in the Hellenistic world and at the peak of the Roman civilization – especially in connection with cultural changes and a certain "orientalization" – as one of the causes of their decline, history shows that it was actually the opposite.

The power of these state entities grew hand in hand with their ability to continuously integrate new ethnicities, cultures and social strata into their communities. This increased the chances of success for competent people and, in turn, contributed to social development, which, as is well-known, is directly proportionate to a society's social dynamics. Conversely, strictly hierarchical societies, where human talent – unless born into the right racial or social circles – is not given the opportunity to progress, are doomed to stagnation and decline.

Gradually, members of other ethnic groups became Roman citizens and in the 1st century A.D. the first Roman senators from the provinces were appointed, and in the 2nd century even some emperors. In the 3rd century, the first non-ethnic Roman became an emperor; the tough yet very competent military commander Maximinus Thrax (as his name suggests, he was of Thracian origin), and he was followed by an emperor of Arabic origin (Philippus Arabs). This multicultural orientation of ancient society was not the exclusive preserve of elites, as marriages between indigenous women and Alexander the Great's soldiers, the Greek colonists of the Hellenistic period and Roman legionnaires, were commonplace. Nevertheless, it was the unsuccessful cohabitation with some ethnicities, especially the Germanic peoples, and the failure to cope with their migration wave, that contributed to the fall of Rome. It was one of the largest migrations in the world's history and is known as the "Migration Period". It took place between the 2nd and 6th centuries A.D. across a vast part of Eurasia, stretching from the western frontiers of China to Western Europe. In the 5th century A.D., concerted pressure from the Huns, Sarmatians, Germanic peoples and Slavs eventually led to the downfall of the Western Roman Empire and the origins of early Medieval European states.

We can say that these migration processes established the political map of Europe and the Mediterranean region which, subject to some changes, has remained in existence to the present day. The Roman Empire failed to pass this last test of multicultural cohabitation – both because of an internal weakness which prevented more generous political projects and as a consequence of a major social, economic and demographic imbalance between the Roman and Germanic worlds. This situation is being warningly compared to what is happening in Europe today. However, we must realize that the invasion of the Germanic peoples was only one of a large number of factors that contributed to the downfall of the Roman Empire, and that it definitely was not a fatally unavoidable factor. Rome's social decadence played a very significant role, as did her unwillingness to integrate the newcomers in a dignified way. After all, until the Germanic pressure came, Rome had been rather successfully developing as a multicultural empire able to integrate the most diverse ethnic and cultural groups. The danger of the type of intercultural clash which destroyed ancient Rome is surely a serious problem which has rapidly arisen today with the growing immigration of a mainly Muslim population from the turbulent regions of North Africa and the Middle East. Naturally, this danger can be prevented through the careful integration of newcomers, making them fully-fledged citizens of the secular state.

These issues are addressed in an excellent study written by Douglas E. Streusand and entitled *European Islam or Islamic Europe?*: "*Various predictions concerning the future of Europe can be reduced to two extremes: we will either see the development of an Islamic Europe where Muslim institutions and traditions have replaced the current secular and Christian institutions and traditions, or we will see the origin of a European Islam under which European Muslims share the European identity created by European Catholics, Protestants and Jews. More than two centuries ago, Edward Gibbon wrote that if Charles Martel had not prevailed in the Battle of Tours in 732, Oxford University would today teach the interpretation of the Quran and the holiness, and veracity of Muhammad's doctrines would be preached to circumcised nations.' Thus, the notion of an Islamic Europe is a reversal of the results attributed to Charles' victory. In contrast, a European Islam would only mean the addition of lessons on Islam to the list of subjects at the Oxford University, without the removal of anything original*" (Streusand, 2004).

Colonization in the Middle Ages

In the Middle Ages, migration mainly took place in the form of *colonization,* and it led to the population of the inhabited areas of Europe. A significant factor in this process was the organized German colonization, which led to the expansion of the German ethnic group into Central Europe and the Baltics. Farmers, craftsmen and miners from the territory of Germany were invited by medieval Czech and Hungarian kings to settle in the unpopulated regions of their kingdoms. This migration not only contributed to the spread of technological achievements from the more advanced Western civilization, but it also served as a form of buffer against the growth of population and the demographic changes occurring in Medieval Europe at that time. In connection with the climatic factor, there were also migrations by the Vikings over a vast area from Scandinavia to the Mediterranean region, to Greenland and – as has been reliably proven – the coast of North America. Another interesting example of medieval and early modern-era migration is the so-called Wallachian (Vlach) colonization which took place over the entire Carpathian area from Romania to the east of Moravia.

The significant rise in migration, especially the mass migration of refugees, brought about social, religious and geopolitical changes in Europe in the early modern era. The pressure from the Turks on the Byzantine Empire, which culminated in the conquest of its metropolis and last bastion, Constantinople (1453), triggered the large-scale emigration of Byzantine scholars to the West, especially to Italy. These intellectuals brought with them extensive libraries, as well as knowledge of the Greek language and ancient Greek philosophy and culture. In the medieval and predominantly Latin Europe of that time these were either completely unknown or at best learned through intermediaries on a "second-hand" basis. Thus, the scholars made a notable contribution to the richness of thought that existed during the Renaissance and to the formation of European culture of the modern era. I

n contrast, the expulsion of Jews, Muslims and also gradually the Moriscos (baptized Muslims) from Spain shortly after the successfully completed Reconquista, led to both the material and spiritual decline of the country, which could not be arrested, even with the enormous fortune which came from the newly acquired colonies. Consequently, Catholic Spain transformed itself into a country lacking freedom of thought, culturally closed and symbolized by a despotic ruler and the inquisition. These two examples show how an essential role can be played by migration and emigration in the growth of civilization in respective areas.

As a result of the Reformation and the subsequent religious wars in the 17th and 18th centuries, swarms of migrants and refugees started wandering across Europe to a degree that was previously unheard of on the continent. For example, there was a mass migration of Irish people fleeing religious and ethnic terror during the reign of Oliver Cromwell. Mass migration at the time of religious disputes also brought quite significant social consequences. For instance, the revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685 by the French king Louis XIV resulted in the mass emigration of 50,000 families of enterprising and creative French Huguenots, mainly to England. Eventually, this loss weakened France, while in England these expatriates and their descendants significantly contributed to the country's economic growth at the start of the industrial revolution. This resulted in the rapid industrialization of England and conversely, France significantly lagged behind. Paradoxically, despite a considerable civilization potential of its own, France approached the industrial revolution substantially later than other countries of Western Europe (Bade, 2003). To a lesser degree, similarly positive consequences for the target country were registered in the case of the emigration of Protestants from Germany. For example, the German sect of Anabaptists (called *habáni* in the Czech lands), who were persecuted in Germany and Switzerland and settled in southern Moravia, made considerable contributions to the growth of crafts (wine-making, production of faience) and pharmaceuticals.

The Impact of Migration in the 20th Century

Radical social changes and ethnic conflicts at the end of the 18th century, and in particular in the 19th century, sparked large migration waves which basically gave rise to the phenomenon of modern refugees. However, a major turning point for migration was the 20th century, which is – and it is not a coincidence – referred to as the century of refugees. Two world wars, numerous nationalist conflicts, disgusting dictatorships, the totalitarian ideologies of Nazism and Communism and attempts for their practical implementation, massive differences in material well-being and the level of social development and unprecedented devastation of the environment, all left their marks on the world in the 20th century and led to forced migrations on an unprecedented scale and of an exceptionally tragic nature, as well as to unprecedented restrictions on the freedom of movement. The different character of migration and its limitations in the previous period are aptly described by Zbigniew Brzezinski (2004: 157): "*Until national states were formed and actually until the time when truly effective border control systems were introduced, people's movement*

was not restricted by the state, but rather by prejudices against non-residents, geographical obstacles and general lack of knowledge of conditions existing outside one's own homeland. In Europe, from the early Middle Ages until the 19th century, a relatively significant freedom of movement was enjoyed by merchants and settlers (e.g. Germans in Eastern Europe and even in Russia), who were even encouraged to do so by enlightened rulers. The discovery of America then opened the doors for almost mass resettlement."

With the exception of the perverse totalitarian systems of Nazism and Communism, the entire modern civilization is characterized by the growth of a wide variety of human freedoms. Paradoxically, one of the most natural of these freedoms – the freedom of movement – is significantly restricted as never before and a phenomenon as obvious as the migration of individuals or groups of people has become an unmanageable threat. However, this is an unnatural and, from a historical viewpoint, basically unprecedented situation. American political scientist Zbigniew Brzezinski (2004: 164) fittingly says: "*The national passport, a typical twentieth century phenomenon, thus actually symbolized mankind's loss of the right to view the Earth as its common home. A consequence of nationalism, from a humane point of view, was a step backward.*" A similar message is carried by the final words of the excellent book *Europe in Motion* by the above mentioned German migration expert Klaus J. Bade (2003: 332): "*Nevertheless, the link between the non-acceptance of individual asylum seekers from crisis areas outside Europe and the fears of the downfall of Europe amidst the gradual influx of masses of migrants is so vague that it can be really used for demagogic purposes only. Until protection against refugees from third-world countries is simultaneously counterbalanced by the elimination of the causes of their flights from the areas of departure, this approach remains a historical scandal by which future generations will measure the understanding of humanity in Europe at the end of the 20th century and in the early 21st century.*" However, these restrictions on the freedom of movement will only prevent us from enjoying the advantages that freedom of movement offers to every society without distinction.

The Politics of Human Mobility

Taking the current refugee situation in the European Union as the starting point, let us now turn to the intricate links between mobility and politics. Migration is just a fraction of the totality of mobilities on different scales and similarly, the movement of refugees represents just one of many different channels of mobility. People move for different reasons and can be classified into different categories based on their movement, such as tourists, immigrants, migrant labourers, refugees, undocumented migrants and academics. However, we are witnessing a blurring of categories as people often move due to a mix of reasons and this makes problematic the division between forced and voluntary migration and its usefulness as an analytical tool. Instead, the concept of power and inequality will be used as the focus for discussion on the politics of human mobility. Borrowing the definition from Tim Cresswell (2010: 21), politics means "social relations that involve the production and distribution of power.

[Politics of mobility are] the ways in which mobilities are both the products of such social relations and are produced by them."

It can be asserted that all movement is political and related to power and hence, it is important to scrutinize who has the power to classify the migrants and create policies concerning mobility. As Ben Rogaly (2015: 529) puts it, "power and inequality are central in understanding why some people do not have as many mobility/fixity options as others." Fixity cannot be omitted when discussing migration. Fixed places, often labelled as moorings, have become increasingly important in human geography. The opposite concept, mobility, has been depicted with many contradictory meanings such as adventure, freedom and threat (Cresswell, 2010: 19). It seems that the latter is the most salient in the current discourse surrounding the refugee situation in Europe.

Tim Cresswell (2010: 22) further argues that "there seems little doubt that mobility is one of the major resources of 21st-century life and that it is the differential distribution of this resource that produces some of the starkest differences today." Mobility can be seen as a resource, when people who move represent a valuable asset to their communities, as well as a divisive force. The following quote highlights this discrepancy. According to Zygmunt Bauman (1998: 9), "mobility has become the most powerful and most coveted stratifying factor." There are some stark differences when it comes to discussing mobility in different contexts. These contradictions will be further depicted in the following sketches, which do not claim to show the current situation in its entirety but want to point out discrepancies inherent in the power relations.

The case of Malta is particularly poignant. With the right kind of resources, people can become mobile and access Maltese citizenship almost instantly, that is within one year, within the framework of the Citizenship by Investment programme (BBC, 2014). It is enough to spend 1.2 million EUR on a property in Malta and then fly into the country at least twice in order to claim an EU passport. It is not even necessary to be resident in Malta but only to show genuine connection to the country. Once in possession of an EU passport, there is no need to ever return to Malta again. People in detention centres in Malta are in stark contrast to this policy. Drawing on Agamben's (2005) concept of biopower or power over bare life, which builds on Foucault's previous writings, we will argue that power works in a certain way on people's lives as well as on their bodies. Fingerprinting migrants arriving to Europe is an example of such practice. It is in stark contrast with the privileged business traveller at Amsterdam's Schiphol Airport who can be subjected to an iris scan and storage of their data in the Privium database in order to speed up their boarding process. The speed of movement is an important criterion in the analysis of how movement becomes political (Cresswell, 2010: 23). The more privileged the person is, the faster they can move. Mobility is further controlled and channelled into "the production of correct mobilities through the designation of routes" (Cresswell, 2010: 24).

As has been argued elsewhere, "global interconnections between highly valued spaces, via extremely capable infrastructure networks, are being combined with strengthening investments in security, access control, gates, walls, CCTV and the paradoxical reinforcement of local boundaries to movement and interaction within the city" (Graham and Marvin, 2001: 206). An example of this is the EURODAC database under the Dublin III regulation which stores migrants' fingerprints in order to prevent people's mobility within the Schengen area. This policy aims to stop, as many call it, "asylum shopping" within EU countries.

There have been cases of self-mutilation amongst migrants, such as burning their fingers so that their scans would be unreadable. This occurs because people have different chances of being granted asylum in different EU countries and a lot depends on people's nationalities. When looking at the statistics of refugee recognition in Europe, 95% of Syrians are granted asylum (or "subsidiary protection") in Europe, and only 2% of Kosovars. For people from Sub-Saharan Africa, the chance of being granted asylum is between 30 and 70% and obviously differs from country to country within the EU (Eurostat, 2015). On top of that, lists of safe third countries are created by many states which are somewhat contradictory to the international refugee regime and its individualistic nature.

Fragmentation of the International Refugee Regime

UNHCR, the United Nations refugee agency, has recently published a poster with a clear message which distinguishes between refugees and migrants. It could imply that migrants are a different kind of people, less deserving (Carling, 2015). Nonetheless, there are many migrants who are vulnerable and need a certain level of help and assistance.

Many people move for a combination of reasons which can also change during their journey. Think about someone who escaped poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa, went to Libya and was later tortured or had to flee due to fear of death. Is this the prototype of the so called economic migrant? Despite the borders being erased between forced and voluntary migration, the umbrella term migrant encompasses all the people who move, including refugees.

UNHCR is not a neutral actor. Its task is to look after a specific type of person, the refugee. If there were no refugees, UNHCR would cease to exist. It is an organization which claims monopoly over the refugees and their definition (excluding the Palestinian refugees, who have a separate UN agency, UNRWA). However, refugees' voices are rarely heard. The current refugee situation cannot be discussed without reference to the Second World War and its aftermath, which led to the creation of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. According to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, a refugee is a person who has had to flee for one or more of the following five reasons: race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. All these reasons are individualized and the states have to determine if the person is to be granted refugee protection.

The 1951 Geneva Convention has not been ratified by all the states and this makes it somewhat problematic to enforce it globally. Nevertheless, the principle of *non-refoulement* (or the prohibition of return or expulsion of the refugees), which is included in this convention, has become part of customary international law, so even the states which are not party to this convention are obliged to follow this principle.

Currently, we are witnessing a fragmentation of the international refugee regime. You can see that many people who flee generalized violence cannot be classified under this Convention. However, there are other regional legal instruments which can be applied in this context: the Cartagena Declaration for Central American States, the African Union's Convention and most recently, the EU Temporary Protection and the EU Qualification directives. These conventions and directives have a broad scope to include people fleeing generalized violence as well as serious harm. The international human rights instruments are equally important when discussing mobility. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights incorporates the right to freedom of movement and the right to leave any country, including a person's own. The UN Convention against Torture confirms that we are legally bound not to hand people over to their persecutors and torturers. These human rights legal instruments complement the pillars of the international refugee regime and are cornerstone in the current situation.

In spite of these legal instruments, which should in theory facilitate asylum for people in need of it, it is virtually impossible to claim asylum in the European Union states without reaching its shores. The concept of friction created by Tim Cresswell (2010) fits well with the current policies which deliberately create frictions and cause some absurd scenarios. An alternative to the dangerous sea crossing for the Syrian refugees has been a route across Russian territory – part of which had to be taken on bikes. In October 2015 more than 1,000 Syrians undertook this journey (BBC, 2015). As there is a legal requirement that this border is not allowed to be crossed on foot, they had to purchase bikes. Piles of bikes were left on the Norwegian side of the border and later crushed.

Conclusion

Mobility is complex, relational and dependent on power and resources. It is equally about the ability to move and about the restrictions on movement which can channel mobility in different directions or produce immobility. This paper has attempted to illustrate different examples of human mobility through history up to the present. In the past, migration brought positive and negative effects. However, it was not perceived as something unnatural. Today we are confronted with images of refugee migration which form only a part of all mobilities on different scales. Furthermore, large scale migrations are nothing new. It is the technology that accompanies them that is new. The current situation in Europe is emblematic of the states' inability to resolve the political situation in their neighbourhood. However, limiting access to asylum procedures by the European states is something that goes against the legal and moral commitments to which we have subscribed

through international legal instruments. It is clear that conflicts which fuel refugee migration are related to power and inequality and will need a political solution. However, to discuss the causes and possible scenarios of the situation requires further analysis, which is beyond the scope of this paper. Let us conclude with the following quote by Peter Adey (2010: 131), "to move is to be political."

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From Recipient to Donor Country - Experience from Central Europe

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Abstract

For more than two decades the Czech Republic (CR) has been both a recipient and a donor of foreign assistance. Since 1989, the Czech Republic has received considerable income in the form of foreign assistance, mainly from EU institutions, but also from the EFTA countries, the World Bank and other international organizations. The Czech Republic has so far paid around 411 bn CZK (cca 15.2 bn EUR) to the EU budget since it joined in May 2004 and has in return received from the EU budget 948 bn CZK (cca 35.1 bn EUR). Thus the CR has been a net recipient of 537 bn CZK (cca 19.9 bn EUR). Former communist Czechoslovakia was very active with respect to selected developing countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America, especially those trying to follow the path of so-called non-capitalist development and had friendly relations with the Soviet bloc. The system and priorities of Czech development cooperation underwent a substantial transformation after 1989. A substantial transformation of the system of Czech development cooperation took place in 2010. It included major legislative, institutional and organizational changes. A very important step was the adoption of the Act on Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid, which became effective from 1st July 2010. The Development Cooperation Strategy of the Czech Republic 2010-2017 was also adopted. Although the CR is one of the most important donors of development assistance among the post-communist countries, both in absolute and in relative terms, it spends much less than the recommended 0.7% of GNI on development cooperation. In 2014 the Czech ODA amounted to 210.21 mil. USD (cca 4.36 bn USD), which was 0.111% GNI. One of the reasons why a significant increase of spending on development cooperation is not one of the priorities of the Czech political parties is that many Czechs consider themselves to be poor compared to the citizens of Western European countries and this strongly influences public opinion.

Key words: recipient of foreign assistance, donor of development aid, development cooperation, developing countries, official development assistance

Introduction

The present situation in the Czech Republic with respect to foreign assistance is rather special in comparison with highly developed Western European countries, because it is at the same time a recipient and a donor of substantial amounts of money both coming to the country and leaving the country.

Taking into account the expression “Third World“ used for the first time by French demograher Alfred Sauvy, communist Czechoslovakia before 1989 was part of the „Second World“. At that time, many of its social and demographic indicators such as literacy rate, life expectancy, infant mortality, etc. were on a similar level to highly developed countries. However, a number of economic indicators such as hourly wages and gross national income per capita corresponded more to the level of middle income developing countries.

Since 1990, Czechoslovakia and later the Czech Republic, has undergone a process of radical political, economic and social transformation. In the political sphere, the country abolished the leading role of the Communist Party and introduced a system of parliamentary democracy and free elections. In the economic sphere, it has experienced a transition from a centrally planned to a market economy. The main components of this process have been the liberalization of prices, the introduction of currency convertibility, privatization and tax reform. One of the important negative effects of the social transition has been an increase in income inequality, unemployment and poverty among some social groups[1]. The country has also transformed its system of development cooperation and has significantly changed its attitude towards developing countries.

The aim of the paper

The aim of this paper is not only to provide an overview of the evolution of the Czech Republic from recipient to donor over the last quarter century, but also to compare the volume of financial resources which have been flowing into the CR in the form of assistance from outside, mainly from EU funds, with the volume of financial resources that have been flowing from the CR in the form of development assistance to developing countries and countries in transition. The comparison of these flows may be considered as the main added value of the paper. The main method applied has been to compare the available statistical data and try to assess the results in a wider context.

It has not been my ambition in this paper to deal with the issue of the quality of Czech development assistance, but the emphasis is mainly on the quantitative aspects of these flows, both in absolute and in relative terms. Nevertheless, I have dedicated a small part of the paper to showing the latest results for the Czech Republic from the point of view of the Commitment to Development Index for 2015. I have also tried to present the main facts about the evolution of the whole system of Czech development cooperation in the period 1990-2015. Finally, I ask three main questions: Is the Czech Republic spending enough on development cooperation? Could the CR afford to spend more for this purpose? How does the CR compare on an international scale? Again by means of selected relevant statistical data and their assessment, I have tried to provide at least partial answers to these questions.

Czech Republic as a recipient of foreign assistance

Since the Velvet Revolution in November 1989, Czechoslovakia, after 1993 the Czech Republic, received some form of assistance from various international organizations such as the World Bank, IMF, EBRD, OECD, etc. Much of it was in the form of consultations, analyses and technical assistance. However, by far the greatest volume of aid has flowed into the Czech Republic from the European Union.

The main instrument of pre-accession support between 1990 and 1999 was the PHARE Programme[2].

It was launched in 1989 in order to help Poland and Hungary, and later other Central and Eastern European candidate countries, to reform their political and economic systems.

Pre-accession support after 2000 consisted mainly of pre-structural funds. Starting from the year 2000, EU financial support for the candidate countries was considerably reinforced in accordance with the new programming period of the EC budget 2000-2006. The PHARE programme was strengthened and modified, and two new financial instruments were launched – ISPA[3] and SAPARD[4].

ISPA was launched in order to support large investment projects (over 5 million EUR) in the field of the environment (mostly water and air pollution, waste management) and transport infrastructure (creation of trans-European networks). The aim of the SAPARD programme was to help candidate countries implement EU legislation in matters related to the Common Agricultural Policy, and to support structural reforms in agriculture and rural development.

After 2000, EU financial assistance to the CR significantly increased. While the allocation for the period 1995-1999 amounted to about 345 mil. EUR (9.7 bn CZK), the total allocation for the CR envisaged for the period 2000-2002 amounted to 237 mil. EUR (7.2 bn CZK).

The pre-structural funds were not conceived ad hoc, but with a clear thought of continuity between the pre- and post-accession support. At the moment of accession, pre-accession aid under PHARE, ISPA and SAPARD was replaced by the standard structural support provided for EU member states under the Structural Funds[5] and Cohesion Fund. One of the main problems connected with EU post-accession regional assistance has been the CR's inability to spend a large amount of the allocated money, often because of the unpreparedness of projects, a lack of transparency, and corruption.

According to a recent estimate[6], the Czech Republic has so far paid around 411 bn CZK (cca 15.2 bn EUR) to the EU budget since it joined the EU in May 2004. The CR has in return received from the EU budget 948 bn CZK (cca 35.1 bn EUR). Thus the CR has been a net recipient of 537 bn CZK (cca 19.9 bn EUR).

Last but not least, assistance from the EFTA[7] countries should also not be forgotten. The CR has been receiving assistance from the so-called Norwegian Funds since its entry into the EU. Since 2004, these funds have supported projects in the CR with more than 6 bn CZK (cca 222 mil. EUR). The major provider of support from these funds is Norway (97%). Two other providers are Iceland and Liechtenstein (members of the EEA[8] but non-members of the EU). The CR has also been receiving assistance from the Programme of Swiss-Czech Co-operation.

Czechoslovak development aid before 1989

Before 1989, "socialist" (communist) Czechoslovakia was strongly engaged in the so-called Third World. However, this engagement was under the control of the Soviet Union and was coordinated by the Politburo of the Communist Party of the USSR. The influence of the "Cold War" situation was omnipresent.

According to some estimates, the volume of Czechoslovak development aid was somewhere between 0.7% and 0.9% of GDP in the 1980s[9]. However, it was difficult to distinguish standard development assistance from military aid and support to various "national liberation movements", which were often terrorist groups. Moreover, it was difficult to estimate the size of the GDP, because the marxist methodology for the calculation of the national income was very different from the standard system of national accounts. At the same time, there was also a problem with defining the correct exchange rate, given the system of multiple exchange rates under the communist regime[10]. As far as territorial priorities before 1989 are concerned, developing countries could be divided into the following three groups:

- "non-European socialist countries": Cuba, North Korea, North Vietnam (after reunification in 1976 the whole Socialist Republic of Vietnam), later also Laos and Cambodia;
- "countries of priority interest": e.g. Ghana, Guinea and Mali in the 1960s; Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, South Yemen and Nicaragua in the 1980s;
- "countries of Czechoslovak interest from the point of view of development of long-term political and economic relations": e.g. Syria, Algeria, Libya, Iraq, India, Congo[11], and Benin in the 1980s.

Czechoslovak and Czech development cooperation from the Velvet Revolution in November 1989 until EU accession

The distrust of Czech citizens concerning the steps undertaken by the communist regime in the field of international relations, especially in the area of international solidarity, and the shift of attention towards domestic political and economic transformation, brought a halt to almost all kinds of development assistance for several years. Thus the volume of Czechoslovak development aid was negligible in the first half of the 1990s. It is almost impossible to find any aggregate data concerning the period 1990-1992 for Czechoslovakia and 1993-2001 for the Czech Republic, because the agenda for development assistance was scattered among different ministries. There was a certain restart to the program of development assistance in 1995 in connection with the entry of the CR into the OECD[12]. In 2002, the total ODA of the Czech Republic amounted to 1 485.9 mil. CZK (45.39 mil. USD), which was only 0.065% of GNI, and in the years before that it had been even less. However, in 2003, one year before the entry into the EU, the total ODA rose to 2 556.0 mil. CZK (90.55 mil. USD), which was 0.101 % of GNI.

A transformation of the Czech development cooperation system started shortly after 2000. In 2001 the Development Centre of the Institute of International Relations was founded as an UNDP project. It was transformed into the Czech Development Agency on 1st January 2008. In 2003 the Department of Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CR was founded. In 2008 the Council on Development Cooperation began its activities.

The Development Cooperation Strategy of the Czech Republic for 2002-2007 was based on the results of a profound analysis and evaluation of development aid of the CR for the period 1996-2000. The main goal of development aid was declared to be the effort to eradicate poverty in developing countries. The Czech government accepted the MDGs and development assistance was declared an important part of Czech foreign policy. In accordance with this strategy, these 20 priority countries were selected: Afghanistan, Angola, Bolivia, Bosnia and Hercegovina, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Macedonia, Mali, Mongolia, Namibia, Nicaragua, Palestine, Salvador, Ukraine, Uzbekistan and Vietnam.

Czech development cooperation after EU accession in 2004

A substantial transformation of the system of Czech development cooperation took place in 2010. It included major legislative, institutional and organizational changes. A very important step was the adoption of the Act on Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid, which became effective from 1st July 2010. The Development Cooperation Strategy of the Czech Republic 2010-2017 was also adopted.

The Act on Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid clearly defines development cooperation and humanitarian aid. It divides power and authority among various state institutions. It legally defines the Czech Development Agency as the implementation tool for Czech development cooperation. In regard to humanitarian aid, the Act divides responsibilities between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CR and the Ministry of the Interior of the CR, while also harmonizing it with the existing system of integrated emergency management.

The Development Cooperation Strategy of the Czech Republic for 2010-2017 considers changes in the foreign policy and economic contexts, as well as new commitments made by the Czech Republic within the European Union and other multilateral forums. It reflects international recommendations concerning the effectiveness, transparency and coherence of development activities. It also updates key goals of Czech development assistance as well as the rules for its provision, and defines new priority sectors and territories.

The Czech Development Agency is responsible for the implementation of development cooperation, including the identification of suitable projects, the organization of selection procedures (both public tenders and grants), the signing of contracts and project monitoring. Representatives of ministries meet on the Council on Development Cooperation and it

provides for inter-ministerial coordination and coherence on the goals and priorities of development cooperation and on other instruments of government policy.

As far as new territorial priorities are concerned, the number of programme countries has been reduced to five. They are the following: Afghanistan, Bosnia and Hercegovina, Ethiopia, Moldova and Mongolia. Project countries where bilateral development cooperation will take place are Georgia, Cambodia, Kosovo, the Palestinian Autonomous Territories and Serbia. Finally, four former programme countries which will continue to receive assistance, though of a redefined focus and scope, are Angola, Yemen, Vietnam and Zambia.

Regarding the new priority sectors of Czech development cooperation, they are the following:

- Environment
- Agriculture
- Social development (including education, social and health services)
- Economic development (including energy)
- Democracy, human rights and social transition

In 2014, the share of multilateral assistance was 70% of the whole amount spent on development cooperation and thus the share of bilateral assistance was only 30%. As far as the destination of Czech bilateral assistance by regions is concerned, the share of Sub-Saharan Africa was 11% of the total amount, that of South and Central Asia was 18%, Other Asia and Oceania 9%, Middle East and North Africa 8%, Latin America and the Caribbean 2% and Europe 41%.

Regarding Czech multilateral assistance by channel, in 2014 the share of United Nations agencies (especially the UNDP[13]) was 7%, European Union institutions (including EDF, DCI, IPA, ENPI and EIHDR)[14] 86%, and the World Bank Group (especially the IDA and IBRD)[15] 4%. The involvement of the Czech Republic in multilateral development cooperation includes also OECD, WTO, international financial institutions (besides the World Bank Group, e.g. the GEF and EBRD)[16] and other international organizations such as the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

The Czech Republic was accepted as a full-fledged member of the OECD-DAC on May 14, 2013. The CR supported the DAC activities with a contribution of 1 mil. CZK in 2013 (cca 37 thousand EUR). A peer review of Czech development cooperation by DAC is planned for 2016.

In 2004, the top ten Czech ODA recipients were the following, starting with the highest, in this order: Iraq, Serbia and Montenegro, Afghanistan, Ukraine, Russia, Vietnam, China, Mongolia, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan.

In 2014, they were the following, also from highest to lowest: Ukraine, Afghanistan, Moldova, Ethiopia, Bosnia and Hercegovina, Georgia, Mongolia, Kosovo, Syria and Serbia.

The Czech Republic's commitment to development

To measure the quality of development cooperation is a very complex issue and it is certainly not an easy task. Although this paper is not focused on the qualitative aspects of Czech development cooperation, it is at least worth mentioning the Commitment to Development Index (CDI) and showing how the Czech Republic fares in this respect compared to other rich countries. The CDI is published annually by the Center for Global Development, which is a U.S. non-profit think tank based in Washington, D.C. The CDI can be considered as one of the best known attempts to construct a multi-dimensional synthetic indicator of the overall quality of development cooperation of a certain country and it enables the ranking of selected countries according to the score achieved. Every index of this kind has its strengths and weaknesses. As far as the CDI is concerned, the selection of the seven components and the equal weighting of components in the Index are sometimes questioned.

The CDI ranks some of the world´s richest countries on their dedication to policies that benefit the five billion people living in poorer nations. All these 27 countries are members of the OECD´s Development Assistance Committee (DAC). The CDI assesses the national efforts in seven policy areas: aid, trade, investment, migration, environment, security and technology. In 2015, the CR was equal 18th in the overall CDI with Hungary and Luxembourg, while Denmark was 1st and Japan 27th. However, when only considering the aid component of the CDI, the CR was 22nd in 2015, while Denmark was once again 1st and South Korea 27th. The aid component of the CDI is composed of a sub-component that assesses the quantity of aid of each donor country and another one that assesses the quality of that aid. Each sub-component includes a number of different indicators.

Is the Czech Republic spending enough on development cooperation?

If we ask whether the Czech Republic is spending enough on development cooperation, the simple answer would clearly be no, it is not. However, the reason why not is much more complex. We can also ask whether the CR could afford to spend more for this purpose. It also makes sense to see how the CR compares internationally.

In the year of EU accession (2004), the Czech Republic received 2.5 times more assistance than it provided for developing countries. In the period from 2004 to the present, the CR received on average from EU funds every year more than 10 times the money it spent on development cooperation.

According to the 2005 European Council decision, the new member countries were supposed to strive to increase their ODA/GNI ratio to 0.17% in 2010 and to 0.33% in 2015. Neither of these goals has been met, nor will they be met by the CR. In 2013, the ODA/GNI ratio was 0.11%, significantly below the DAC average of 0.30%.

The Czech Republic is part of the group of 40 richest countries in the world, so it is only natural to ask whether it could spend more on development cooperation than is the case today.

According to the IMF[17], the CR was, with 19 563 USD of GDP per capita (in exchange rate) ranked 40th out of 184 countries, and with 29 925 USD of GDP per capita (in PPP[18]) it was ranked 38th out of 187 countries in 2014. In 2014, the GDP per capita (in PPS[19]) was 84% of the EU average. However, in 2011, the average nominal monthly wage in the CR was only 35.6% of the EU average, compared to 132.3 % in Germany[20]. According to estimates by economic experts from Czech trade unions, in 2014 the Czech hourly wage was 6.85 EUR (cca 185 CZK) compared to the German hourly wage of 24.4 EUR and the Austrian hourly wage of 23.25 EUR. Thus in 2014 the Czech hourly wage only reached 28% of the German and 29% of the Austrian levels. According to the latest estimates, the price level in the CR is only 60% of the EU average. Although the compararative price level increased significantly after 1989, it has been decreasing over the last several years.

According to Eurostat, Prague was, with a GDP per capita in PPS of 173% of the EU-28 average, the 8th richest region in the EU in 2013, ahead of Vienna (159%) and Berlin (113%). However, according to an UBS survey, the hourly wages in Prague, which are by far the highest of all regions in the CR, are still only a fraction of the hourly wages to be found in all Western European cities and are even below the hourly wages in cities from such developing and emerging market countries as São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, Santiago de Chile, Johannesburg, Istanbul and Moscow. In 2014, the Prague net hourly wage was 20.3% of the New York City net hourly wage, while the Berlin net hourly wage was 64.5% of the NYC net hourly wage.

Some of these data may partly explain why many Czechs, even after 25 years of political, economic and social transformation, still feel relatively poor compared to the most developed countries, and are often unwilling to spend more on aid for developing countries. This attitude is also reflected in the present refugee crisis.

Conclusions

The Czech Republic benefited significantly from foreign assistance in the period 1990-2015, mainly from EU institutions and to a much lesser degree from other international organizations such as the World Bank and the EBRD. Since the Velvet Revolution in November 1989, the CR has been a net recipient of 537 bn CZK (cca 19.9 bn EUR) from EU funds. The CR expects to receive from the EU for the programme period 2014-2020, 650 bn CZK (cca 23.8 bn EUR), i.e. almost 93 bn CZK (cca 3.4 bn EUR) per year. If we compare this amount to the Czech ODA of 210.21 mil. USD (cca 4.36 bn USD), which was 0.111% GNI in 2014, we see that the CR is receiving many times more in foreign assistance than it is spending on development cooperation. According to the actual volume of GNI, the ODA calculated at the percentage of 0.33% of GNI, should reach cca 12 bn CZK (cca 493 mil. USD). i.e. three times more than at present.

It would certainly be desirable for the CR to try to reach the goal of 0.33% as soon as possible, and later aim to reach the goal of 0.7% of GNI.

It must be taken into account though that the Czech average wage level is still considerably below the level of all Western European countries. Therefore, it will not be easy for any political party in the CR to push through a significant increase in expenditure in the field of development cooperation or to convince its electorate about the urgency of such a step in the near future. However, a positive change in public opinion in favour of increasing expenditure on development cooperation may come if the present relatively high economic growth continues for several more years and the gap between the wages in the CR and Western Europe narrows significantly. Needless to say, even more important than the amount of money spent on development cooperation, both absolutely and relatively, is the efficiency of these expenditures, but that is already another key topic.

Annex: tables

Table 1. EU finance for the Czech Republic per year (before accession)

	1995-1999 (in mil. EUR)	1995-1999 (in bn CZK)	2000-2002 (in mil. EUR)	2000-2002 (in bn CZK)
PHARE	69	2.5	79.0	2.7
ISPA	-	-	57.2-83.2	1.9-2.7
SAPARD	-	-	22.1	0.7
Total	69	2.5	173.1	5.7

(Samková 2003)

Table 2. Total amount of allocations from EU funds for the CR after accession

period	in bn CZK	in bn EUR
2004-2006	45.7	1.5
2007-2013	704	27.3
2014-2020	650	23.8

(EU News Monthly Journal 2010- 2015)

Table3. Difference between income and payments to the EU budget in 2005-2015

year	in bn CZK	in mil. EUR
2005	2.0	66.6
2006	3.2	112.3
2007	2.1	73.1
2008	26.2	1 096.5
2009	29.0	1 120.1
2010	22.7	883.4
2011	17.4	714.73
2012	6.9	269.1
2013	14.9	574.2
2014	56.4	2 054.6
2015 (1st half]	126.8	4 654.1

(EU News Monthly Journal 2010-2015)

Table 4. Total funds provided by the Czech Republic in the form of official development assistance in 2004-2010

year	ODA (mil. USD)	ODA (bn CZK)	ODA/GNI (in %)
2004	108.17	2.78	0.11
2005	169.60	3.24	0.11
2006	190.62	3.64	0.12
2007	190.40	3.64	0.11
2008	222.50	4.25	0.12
2009	213.71	4.08	0.12
2010	227.56	4.34	0.13

(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic 2010)

Table 5. Official development assistance of the Czech Republic (mil. USD)

year	2011	2012	2013	2014
ODA Total	250.46 4.43 bn CZK	219.63 4.29 bn CZK	210.88 4.12 bn CZK	210.21 4.36 bn CZK
Bilateral ODA	76.95	66.44	57.04	62.57
Budget support	0.00	0.00	0.05	0.96
Bilateral core contributions & pooled programmes & funds	2.17	2.68	3.92	3.15
Project type interventions	33.88	31.87	26.02	30.42
Experts and other technical assistance	15.47	11.46	6.33	5.45
Scholarships and student costs in donor countries	5.48	4.56	5.44	5.15
Debt relief	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Administration costs not included elsewhere	6.36	4.98	4.56	4.43
Other in-donor expenditures (development awareness, refugees)	13.58	10.88	10.72	13.01
Multilateral ODA	173.51	153.20	153.84	147.64
ODA/GNI	0.125%	0.124%	0.114%	0.111%

(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic 2015)

Table 6. Czech bilateral assistance by region (mil. USD)

region	2011	2012	2013	2014
Sub-Saharan Africa	8.26	7.09	6.66	7.14
South and Central Asia	17.58	18.82	9.96	11.07
Other Asia and Oceania	7.99	6.94	7.11	5.55
Middle East and North Africa	4.74	6.05	6.02	4.88
Latin America and the Caribbean	1.96	1.20	1.44	1.24
Europe	20.02	19.06	18.24	25.59
Unspecified	16.40	7.28	7.61	7.10
Total	76.95	66.44	57.04	62.57

(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic 2015)

Table 7. Czech bilateral assistance by income group (mil. USD)

income group	2011	2012	2013	2014
Least developed countries (LDCs)	21.23	21.33	12.11	14.33
Other low income countries	1.08	0.86	0.37	0.23
Lower middle income countries	22.67	23.97	22.41	27.37
Upper middle income countries	13.59	11.09	11.49	10.73
Unallocated by income	18.38	9.18	10.66	9.91
Total	76.95	66.44	57.04	62.57

(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic 2015)

Table 8. Czech bilateral assistance by sector (mil. USD)

sector	2011	2012	2013	2014
Social infrastructure	38.26	33.11	26.08	27.13
Economic infrastructure	5.65	4.47	3.63	1.76
Production sector	6.56	5.40	5.29	5.57
Multisector	2.57	1.37	1.09	2.68
Humanitarian aid	3.97	4.95	4.79	7.17
Administrative costs of donors	6.36	4.98	4.56	4.43
Refugees in donor countries	11.72	9.52	8.94	11.55
Unspecified	1.86	2.64	2.67	2.27
Total	76.95	66.44	57.04	62.57

(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic 2015)

Table 9. Czech multilateral assistance by channel (mil. USD)

channel	2011	2012	2013	2014
United Nations agencies	8.37	7.84	9.93	9.91
European Union institutions	143.13	117.65	118.23	127.17
World Bank Group	15.65	16.86	8.09	5.94
Regional development banks	5.61	4.72	3.84	0.00
Other agencies	0.75	6.13	13.76	4.62
Total	173.51	153.20	153.84	147.64

(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic 2015)

Table 10. European DAC members´ net official development assistance in 2012

country	ODA in mil. USD	ODA/GNI (in %)
Austria	1 106	0.28
Belgium	2 315	0.45
Czech Republic	220	0.11
Denmark	2 693	0.85
Finland	1 320	0.55
France	12 028	0.41
Germany	12 939	0.38
Greece	327	0.13
Iceland	26	0.26
Ireland	808	0.45
Italy	2 737	0.16
Luxembourg	399	1.00
Netherlands	5 523	0.71
Norway	4 753	0.93
Poland	421	0.09
Portugal	581	0.28
Slovak Republic	80	0.09
Slovenia	58	0.13
Spain	2 037	0.16
Sweden	5 240	0.47
Switzerland	3 056	0.47
United Kingdom	13 891	0.56

(OECD 2014)

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Notes

[1] Despite these facts, the Czech Republic still has one of the lowest income inequalities in the world (as measured e.g. by the Gini coefficient of concentration, at present it has the second lowest unemployment rate from all EU countries and the smallest share of population below the poverty line of all OECD countries.
[2] originally PHARE - Pologne-Hongrie Actions pour la Reconversion Economique
[3] ISPA - Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession
[4] SAPARD - Special Accession Programme for Rural Development
[5] European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), European Social Fund (ESF), European Agricultural and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF), Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance (FIFG)
[6] the Czech Press Agency (ČTK), October 2015
[7] EFTA - European Free Trade Association
[8] EEA - European Economic Area
[9] see e.g. Horký, O. (2010)
[10] Different exchange rates existed for commercial and non-commercial payments, tourist exchange rate, etc., besides a black market exchange rate which perhaps reflected the real situation in the best way.
[11] the former French colony Congo with the capital Brazzaville
[12] Czech Republic was the first post-communist country to join the OECD.
[13] UNDP - United Nations Development Programme
[14] EDF - European Development Fund, DCI - Development Cooperation Instrument, IPA - Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance, ENPI - European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, EIDHR - European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights
[15] IDA - International Development Association, IBRD - International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
[16] GEF - Global Environment Facility, EBRD - European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
[17] IMF – International Monetary Fund
[18] PPP – purchasing power parity
[19] PPS – purchasing power standard
[20] EU News Monthly Journal, Česká spořitelna, December 2013

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A genuine ethic of responsibility that restores the trust in human beings

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Abstract

The honesty that generates confidence, or the lack of honesty that loses it, seems to be at the heart of the issue of sustainable development. And of its future. The paper analyses two examples coming from personal experience and draws some principles and concrete courses of action. The first example refers to the Volkswagen-Audi affair or scandal, the second one to usual food quality. The conclusion pleids for a genuine ethic of responsibility that restores the trust of women and men in human beings, in citizens who are more honest because they are more aware of their contribution to sustainability.

Key words: Brundtland Report, confidence, ethics, Václav Havel, food security, foresight, responsability, sustainability, US Environment Protection Agency, Volkswagen-Audi

Introduction

When one considers the qualities of the good foresight specialist or foresight team, one concludes that both creativity and rigour are required; above all, in-depth system analysis needs to be combined with a far-reaching and wide-ranging viewpoint, a cross-disciplinary mind-set and strategic will: in other words, there must be action, determination and the technical capacity for implementation. In the public domain, there is also a need for detachment from political contingencies and timing constraints in order to ensure the independence of foresight. An emeritus professor of the National Conservatory of Arts and Crafts in Paris, the economist Jacques Lesourne, who formerly held the Chair of Industrial Foresight, believes that the fundamental quality criterion for foresight is intellectual honesty (Lesourne 2000). On the other hand, the promoters of the *State of the Future*, the directors of The Millennium Project Elizabeth Florescu and Jerry Glenn wrote in their 2015-2016 report that *the proliferation of unethical decisions that led to the 2008 crisis clearly demonstrated the interdependence of economic results and ethics. Quick fixes avoided a global financial collapse and pulled the world out of recession, but the underlying ethical questions have not been addressed sufficiently to prevent futures crises* (Glenn, Florescu, and The Millennium Project Team 2015).

The honesty that generates confidence, or the lack of honesty that loses it, seems to me today to be at the heart of the issue of sustainable development. And of its future. I will try to show this through two examples from my own personal experience, from which I will then derive some principles and concrete courses of action.

Technological manipulation and efficient poisoning

No one will be surprised if I take my first example from what is now being referred to as the Volkswagen-Audi affair or scandal, which has assumed global proportions since 18 September 2015, the date on which the US Environment Protection Agency (EPA) criticised

the attitude of the leading global automotive group and an investigation was launched by the Justice Department of the United States. Behind these investigations is an American NGO called the International Council on Clean Transportation, which had commissioned West Virginia University to perform a study of the comparative levels of pollution from diesel engines in the United States and Europe. The tests conducted by the researchers in real traffic conditions revealed far higher pollution levels (between 20 and 35 times higher than the legal limit, depending on the model) than those reported by the manufacturer. The EPA in California therefore notified Volkswagen and Audi that they were in breach of the Clean Air Act, and found that the models sold in the United States since 2009 (some 482,000 vehicles) had software that circumvented the emissions standards established by the EPA. Contrary to what is regularly claimed, the American standards are far stricter than those in force in Europe (United States Environmental Protection Agency 2015). The EPA's announcement produced a chain reaction, as it quickly became apparent that the engines of all the manufacturer's vehicles around the world – more than 11 million cars – were fitted with this cheat device. In addition to the financial damage this has caused in various global stock exchanges, the irreversible collapse of trust in this leading German group has brought about an economic disaster.

I have chosen this example because it constitutes a flagrant illustration of my point, but also because I understand its effects on an individual level, as I have been personally affected by this affair.

On 24 May 2013, after 40 years of loyalty to a French make, I entered, as the welcome letter put it, the 'world of Audi' for the first time. The message was clearly indicated on the documents that were handed to me that day: Audi San Mazuin Namur thanked me for the 'trust' I had shown in them. It was important for me to know, they wrote, that 'my satisfaction' was their 'absolute priority'(San Mazuin 2015). The delivery of the vehicle was presented as a special experience, as indeed it probably was, with due pomp and circumstance.

My motivation for this change was that I wanted a clean and efficient vehicle. The model was an Audi A4 Sedan TDIe (for 'efficiency'), with a 2 litre, 136 hp engine, emissions advertised on the order form of 112 g of CO2 per kilometre (emission standard EU5 according to Directive 94/12/EC) on mixed-drive trips, and fuel consumption of 4.3 litres (1999/100/EC).

Having reduced my vehicle's engine power in order to reduce my fuel consumption and limit emissions during the years prior to this purchase, I have to admit that this new Audi gave me driving pleasure while ensuring that I was behaving in line with the logic of sustainability that I regularly advocate. Living in the countryside, I make a lot of trips by car. Although I regularly use the train to travel to Brussels and Paris, I drive more than 30,000 km per year. Various contacts with my Audi dealer over the course of twenty months gave me almost complete satisfaction, even though I was sometimes slightly irritated by the ea-

gerness with which the staff got me to fill in satisfaction surveys on touch screens, and their insistence that I should assign them the highest ratings. In February 2014, I received a brochure from my dealer that reminded me that 'the Audi warranties' represented 'peace of mind in all circumstances'. And that my car was under 'a comprehensive two-year warranty'. However, my trust was abruptly shattered long before the international scandal over the deceptive software.

On the morning of 17 February 2015, after 21 months and 88,000 kms, my Audi A4 broke down on the motorway, after I had driven about ten kilometres. The verdict was implacable: the clutch disc had gone, and the repair would cost more than 3,200 euros. To my shock, I was told that the warranty was not applicable, as there had been no oil leakage. The employee at Audi Mazuin was unwavering on this point: the repair was my responsibility and the Audi clutch could not be defective. I must have been driving with my foot on the clutch pedal (when you have been driving for 40 years and you were taught by your father, who was a motor mechanic, that really amuses you). And then came the hammer blow: 'If you are not happy, simply find a lawyer and go to court. You will not be the first to lose.' Most surprising of all, perhaps, for a specialist in evaluation, was the answer I was given when, after collecting my repaired vehicle, I asked the attendant why on this particular day I had not been presented with the touch screen in order to record my views about the service: 'No need, we could see that you weren't happy'.

Need I say that what I felt went beyond mere dissatisfaction? I had a real sense of betrayal and, above all, of a breach of trust. This was six months before the VW-Audi scandal. The research I carried out at that time gave me some hints and a few first-hand accounts – although they did not amount to proof – of the fragility of the clutches in these models, as well as of the hauteur, not to say arrogance, of the manufacturer on this subject. Nevertheless, I preferred to believe that the problem was more to do with the dealership than with the manufacturer.

The circular letter – I know it was this as it was unsigned and addressed 'Dear Sir or Madam' – that I received on 7 October 2015, bearing the Audi logo and written by the Director of Audi Import Belgium, confirmed this arrogance. It stated that it was the Volkswagen Group that had admitted having installed software to show a reduction in the level of of nitrogen oxide emissions when vehicles were tested. It was the Volkswagen Group that had identified my Audi among the tampered vehicles, and neither the distributor nor 'we' (was that Audi or the Import Director?) 'were aware of these irregularities', which they regretted. Thus, the Volkswagen Group was mentioned four times, as the external agent of which Audi had been the victim (Didier Willems 2015).

Local junk food

After the Volkswagen-Audi Affair, most of the comments that could be read in the social networks and heard in the media and the statements by politicians of all stripes tended to denounce unregulated capitalism and go on at length about profiteering, unscrupulous

businesses and financial groups and so on. They often contrasted such behaviour with another model, that of sustainable development, environmentalism and even green politics.

This is why I wish to set alongside my first example, which was bound up in a personal experience but had a global aspect, another situation that was very different. When we bring together these two experiences, this second situation will compel us to draw more nuanced conclusions.

Just a few kilometres from the Audi garage, on the same main road, lies a large store based on an idea that I strongly support. I will not mention the store's name, as its financial capacity is nowhere near that of a global automotive group. It is a grocery store that has set itself the goal of 'encouraging shopping behaviour that favours local products'. It sells hundreds – perhaps as many as a thousand – products of certified authenticity, supplied by 150 producers, most of which have been made less than 30 kms from the point of sale. The company, which has won several labels in this field, describes itself as 'a sustainable and innovative business' and aims to be a partner to 'active and responsible customers'. Coincidentally, I discovered this store at about the same time I changed my car, and I went there fairly regularly to buy food, particularly dairy products, fruit and some meat sourced from local butchers and farms. I frequently recommended the store to my family and friends. Until the day…

Until the day in June 2015 when, returning from Namur, I did some quick shopping on my way home. While I was preparing the ordinary sausages I had purchased in this supposedly sustainable store, my attention was caught by a printed label on the back of the packaging. It was the list of ingredients that the product contained, as required by European regulations(European Parliament and Council of the European Union 2011): *Beef 79%, sauce (water, sambal (chilli, acidity regulator (E260)), salt, soya oil, modified starch (corn), milk protein, spices, colouring (E160c), stabilisers (E450, E451), thickeners (E412, E415), preservative (E202, E211), gluten, egg, fish, mustard, celery, water, vegetable fibre (bamboo), stabilisers (E262, E331), salt, antioxidants (E301, E300)*

Obviously, I cannot guarantee the quality of my transcription 100%, given the size of the font. Reading the label, I felt as though I had crossed the European motorway network from one side to the other. Not being a chemist (although I studied a combination of Latin/humanities and sciences), it was probably the idea of the fish in my banger that I found most offensive, along with the instruction *Bien cuire / Goed doorgaren* ('Cook thoroughly'), which a beef product would not necessarily require. My reaction was clear and simple. I tossed the 324 grams of *corpus delicti* in the bin and have never set foot in the store since, and never will. 'Trust', you said?

Conclusion: sustainable development as ethics of responsibility

To leave the anecdotal side of these two tales behind, I wish to come back to the question of the future of sustainable development, drawing a few lessons – both general and personal – from these two experiences.

Our scientific instincts bring us to a standard and a question. The standard is a definition of sustainable development on which everyone can agree. The question is how this type of development is affected by these two experiences and what this may mean for the future of our civilisation.

I will not waste your time and mine on the issue of sustainable development. As far as I am concerned, the best definition is still that of the Brundtland Report. This refers, as you know, to meeting the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet theirs. However, we often forget the two priorities that are then mentioned: the attention we must pay to the most disadvantaged members of society, and the limitations that both technology and social organisation impose on the environment.

You will tell me – and rightly so – that the most disadvantaged couldn't care less about cheat software that affects the health of drivers and their families, and, what is more, they have little opportunity to be picky about the quality of chicken breast, tuna or chopped beef they find at cheaper outlets. True enough. My answer is that the cynicism that seems to prevail throughout the value chain, starting with the products that are labelled 'premium' or 'sustainable', 'organic' or 'local' (as in 'local produce') – which nowadays represent an alternative form of luxury – augurs ill for those who shop in the largest supermarkets that carry no quality labels. At the same time, it should be pointed out that the vigilance of citizens and NGOs, and the checks made by public bodies such as the EPA in the United States or the AFSCA in Belgium for foodstuffs, represent a safeguard. We should also remember that every major crisis – the Union Carbide disaster in Bhopal, dioxin chickens in Belgium, contaminated blood in France, mad cow disease in the UK, the disaster incurred by Tepco at Fukushima Daiichi and the dishonest software of the Volkswagen-Audi Group, to name but a few – serve as learning experiences for sustainable development.

Returning to the Brundtland Report, it will be recalled that this advocates a quest for harmony, meaning a happy combination of the elements of a system which ensures that those elements contribute to the same overall effect and so enable it to achieve its aims. Thus, sustainable development activates a series of subsystems that make the coherence of the whole possible and contribute to the achievement of its objectives: effective participation by citizens in decision-making, the ability to generate economic surpluses and to create technical knowledge on a sustained and self-reliant basis, the ability to find solutions to tensions arising from disharmonious development, respect for the obligation to preserve the ecological base for development, the search for new technological solutions, answers to international questions concerning trade and finance, and administrative flexibility that leaves room for self-correction, and in particular evaluation processes (UNWCED 1987).

The Brundtland Report also addressed the role of transnational corporations, especially in the automotive sector – one of the subjects that were judged to be very environmentally sensitive (p. 72). The Norwegian Prime Minister and her United Nations team also called for a reduction of urban and industrial air pollution, and regretted the feebleness of efforts to combat automobile pollution, showing that it had systemic effects on both the global environment and human health (p. 143-144). On food issues, the report talks more about global security of supply than about the issue of quality from a health viewpoint, other than in the scenario of a nuclear accident.

We have seen, however, that the answers to the questions we have asked and to the experiences we have had or observed were not technical or normative in nature, given that standards do exist in these areas. The answers we are looking for, the safeguards for which we are calling, are of a different nature: they are moral, ethical ones. In the last part of her 1987 report, Gro Hartlem Brundtland wrote that she had 'tried to show how human survival and well-being could depend on success in elevating sustainable development to a global ethic' (p. 252).

It is here that the future of sustainable development probably lies: in its ability to turn, beyond international targets, guidelines and regulations, into a common and shared conscience, into a morality that prevails over petty profit, grubby trickery and deceptions that pose a threat to health. A genuine ethic of responsibility that restores the trust of women and men in human beings, in citizens who are more honest because they are more aware that by contributing to the advancement of our common path, they are helping ensure the survival of their children and grandchildren. And, incidentally, their own.

Can we remind ourselves of Václav Havel's message when he said high and loud that truth and love must prevail over lies and hatred? Professor Pavel Novacek, chair of the Central Europe Node of The Millennium Project and author of a remarkable book about sustainable development, quotes these words of the president-philosopher: *I have no illusion to be the one to change the world. However, I proceed from the imperative that each and every one of us is obliged to act as if they were able to improve the entire world* (Nováček 2011).

We all know that the task seems endless and that, in fact, we will never be enough to achieve it.

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